In short
The disposition effect is the tendency to sell investments that are showing a gain and to hold on to those showing a loss, so that profits are taken early and losses are carried in the hope that they come back. It was named for stock trading, where brokerage records show it plainly, and the same pattern turns up in house sales, employee share plans, sports betting and any decision where a purchase price becomes the line between winning and losing.
How the disposition effect works
A purchase price is a fact about your own past rather than about a company's prospects, and it is nonetheless the number that decides most sales. Once a position is filed as a winner or a loser, the two sides of that line get treated differently: the winner offers a gain that can be banked today, and the loser offers a loss that only becomes real at the moment of sale. Holding on keeps it on paper.
Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman put four mechanisms together in 1985. Prospect theory supplies the shape: measured from the purchase price, the value curve is concave in the region of gains, which makes a certain gain attractive, and convex in the region of losses, which makes a gamble on recovery attractive. Mental accounting supplies the ledger, because each holding gets its own account rather than being judged as part of a portfolio. Regret aversion supplies the motive to wait, since selling converts a bad decision into an admitted one. Self-control supplies the rest: people describe the rule they cannot keep, which is to cut losses.
Later work added another ingredient. On the realization utility account of Nicholas Barberis and Wei Xiong, the pleasure comes at the moment a gain is booked rather than from the wealth itself, which predicts the trading pattern observed and also predicts that investors will sell winners even when they expect them to keep rising. Market consequences follow: Andrea Frazzini showed in 2006 that the reluctance to sell at a loss slows the way prices absorb bad news, which is part of why stock prices drift after earnings announcements.
The pattern is not a laboratory artifact, and it is not explained away by tax. Martin Weber and Colin Camerer ran the trading game in a laboratory in 1998 and found the same preference for selling winners, with one instructive exception: when their design sold every position automatically at the end of each period, so that holding on required an active repurchase, the effect was much smaller. That is the clearest evidence that the behavior depends on who has to act, not on a view about the assets.
The original study
The name comes from Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman's 1985 paper in the Journal of Finance, "The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory and evidence." It is a theory paper: the authors drew together prospect theory, mental accounting, regret and self-control into a single account of why investors trade this way, and assembled the evidence then available, including the awkward fact that the tax-efficient strategy in the United States is the opposite of what investors do.
The decisive test came in 1998, when Terrance Odean published "Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?" in the same journal. He had the trading records of 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage from 1987 to 1993, which let him do something earlier work could not: count not just the sales but the opportunities. For each day an investor sold anything, he counted how many of their holdings were showing a gain and how many were showing a loss, then measured what fraction of each was actually sold.
The proportion of gains realized was 0.148 and the proportion of losses realized was 0.098. Investors were selling their winners at about one and a half times the rate at which they sold their losers, and this was not a reflection of a shrewd view about the stocks: the winners they sold outperformed the losers they kept by 3.4 percent over the following year. Loss realizations rose in December, the month in which the tax benefit of booking a loss is most salient, which is the pattern a tax-driven investor would show all year.
Read the diagram and evidence as text
Matched portfolios contain positions above or below a purchase-price divider. A gain follows an exit route; a loss follows a holding loop. These routes illustrate the tendency, not a rule for every position. Shared 0–100% rails show aggregate proportions realized: 14.8% for gains and 9.8% for losses.
Sell the winner, keep the loser
Bars: aggregate proportions realized; counts of positions, not dollars
Purchase price: Defines the measured gain/loss categories
Showing a gain: Proportion of gains realized: 14.8%
Showing a loss: Proportion of losses realized: 9.8%
The following year: Sold winners’ mean excess return exceeded held losers’ by 3.4 percentage points
Waiting for a rebound: Not directly measured as the motive for holding losses
Purchase price → classifies realized and paper gains → Showing a gain
Purchase price → classifies realized and paper losses → Showing a loss
Showing a gain → what the sold winners did next → The following year
Showing a loss → what the kept losers did next → The following year
Showing a loss → behavior does not identify each investor’s motive → Waiting for a rebound (error transition)
| Condition | Value and unit | Evidence quote |
|---|---|---|
| Realized gains / (realized + paper gains); counts aggregated across accounts and sale days | 14.8 percent | Entire Year: PLR 0.098; PGR 0.148 [Display conversion: 0.148 is 14.8 percent.] |
| Realized losses / (realized + paper losses); counts aggregated across accounts and sale days | 9.8 percent | Entire Year: PLR 0.098; PGR 0.148 [Display conversion: 0.098 is 9.8 percent.] |
| Winners sold against losers kept | 3.4 percentage points of average excess return over one year | the average excess return over the following year is 3.4 percent more |
Odean's method, usually written as the gap between the proportion of gains realized and the proportion of losses realized, became the standard measure, and the same gap has since been reported in other countries, in professional as well as retail accounts, and in assets from houses to employee stock. Where it has been found to shrink is in accounts run with rules: automatic rebalancing, scheduled contributions and designs like Weber and Camerer's, where keeping a position takes an action.
Everyday examples
The effect needs only a purchase price and the option to wait. The rows below are illustrations, not findings from the studies cited on this page.

| Situation | What the bias does | What helps |
|---|---|---|
| A portfolio with one holding up and one down, and cash needed this month | The winner is sold because booking a gain feels like a decision and booking a loss feels like an admission | Decide from your view of each holding today, and check the tax consequence of each sale |
| A house worth less than it was bought for | The asking price is set from the purchase price, and the house sits unsold for months | Price from recent comparable sales, which is the only number a buyer sees |
| Employee shares that have fallen since vesting | They are held until they recover, which concentrates both salary and savings in one company | Set a selling schedule when the shares vest, before the price gives you a reference point |
| A fund marked for sale in a written plan, now below what was paid for it | The sale is postponed until the fund gets back to the purchase price, so the plan quietly becomes a waiting position | Write the sale date and the bands down in advance, and automate the order |
| A bet placed early in the day at the track or on an exchange | Losses get chased with bigger stakes while small wins are cashed out | Set the stake and the stop before the first bet, and treat each one as independent |
How to counter it
Every workable counter removes the purchase price from the decision. This page describes research findings and is not advice about your own money.
- Ask the buying question instead of the selling question. Would you put money into this holding today at today's price? If not, the gain or loss you are sitting on is not a reason to keep it.
- Write the rules before the prices move. Rebalancing bands, a schedule for selling vested shares and a position limit all decide the sale in advance.
- Make holding the action. In Weber and Camerer's experiment the effect shrank when positions were closed automatically and had to be bought back deliberately.
- Judge the portfolio, not the position. Mental accounting is one of the four mechanisms in the original theory, and the counter to it is to look at the total rather than at each line.
- Check the tax arithmetic rather than assuming it supports you. In the United States, realizing a loss can offset realized gains, which is the opposite of what the behavior does for eleven months of the year.
What it is not
The disposition effect has three close neighbors, and the difference is in what the decision is anchored to.
- It is not the sunk cost fallacy, which is about continuing to spend because of what has already been spent. The disposition effect needs no further investment: holding a losing position is a decision not to sell, and the costs are the returns given up.
- It is not loss aversion, which is the asymmetry that losses weigh more than equal gains. Loss aversion is one ingredient in the explanation; the disposition effect is the trading pattern that results once a purchase price defines where losses begin.
- It is not the endowment effect, the higher value placed on what you already own. That raises the price you would accept for anything you hold, whether it has risen or fallen; the disposition effect treats risen and fallen holdings differently.
Tests and tools that use this
Related biases
Disposition Effect FAQ
What is the disposition effect?
It is the tendency to sell investments that are showing a gain and to keep those showing a loss. Shefrin and Statman named it in 1985, and Odean measured it in 1998 in the records of 10,000 brokerage accounts: investors realized 14.8 percent of their available gains and 9.8 percent of their available losses. The purchase price, which says nothing about future returns, is what separates the two groups.
Why do investors sell winners and keep losers?
Prospect theory measures outcomes from a reference point, usually the purchase price, and treats risk differently on each side of it: a certain gain is attractive, while a gamble that might undo a loss beats accepting the loss. Add mental accounting, which judges each holding on its own, and regret, since a sale turns a bad decision into an admitted one, and the four pieces of Shefrin and Statman's explanation are in place.
How does the demo on this page work?
You take three decisions about the same two positions: which to sell when one is up and one is down, which sale is better for this year's taxes, and which to sell when only the purchase prices change. Letting the gain or loss decide at any step counts as the pattern in the brokerage data. Choosing on your view of the companies, or on the tax arithmetic, does not. Only the outcome label leaves your browser.
Does the disposition effect cost money?
In Odean's data it did. The winners his investors sold went on to outperform the losers they kept by 3.4 percent over the following year, so the sales were on the wrong side of the subsequent returns. The behavior also runs against the United States tax rule that realized losses can offset realized gains, which is why loss realizations rise in December. Those are findings about that sample, not a forecast for any portfolio.
Is the disposition effect the same as the sunk cost fallacy?
No. The sunk cost fallacy is about putting more money or time into something because of what has already gone in. The disposition effect requires no new spending: it is the refusal to close a position that is down and the eagerness to close one that is up. They can appear together, since both treat a past number as relevant to a current choice, but the decisions they distort are different ones.
How do professional investors avoid it?
Mostly with rules rather than resolve. Rebalancing bands, written sell criteria, scheduled sales of vested shares and mandates that cap the size of a position all take the decision out of the moment when the price is in front of you. The effect also shrinks in designs where holding on requires an action, which is what Weber and Camerer found when positions were closed automatically at the end of each period.
References
- Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 40(3), 777-790. doi.org
- Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? The Journal of Finance, 53(5), 1775-1798. doi.org
- Weber, M., & Camerer, C. F. (1998). The disposition effect in securities trading: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 33(2), 167-184. doi.org
- Frazzini, A. (2006). The disposition effect and underreaction to news. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 2017-2046. doi.org
- Barberis, N., & Xiong, W. (2012). Realization utility. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(2), 251-271. doi.org
Cite this source
Psychology.com. (2026, October 21). Disposition Effect. Psychology.com. https://psychology.com/biases/disposition-effect
